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Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus 
 
Eric Dubois1 
 
Abstract: The aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last 
four decades following Nordhaus’s (1975) publication on political business cycles (PBCs). I 
first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this 
ground-breaking contribution saw the light of the day. I also present a simplified version of 
Nordhaus’s model to highlight his key results. I detail some early critiques of this model and 
the fields of investigations to which they gave birth. I then focus on the institutional context 
and examine its influence on political business cycles, the actual research agenda. Finally, I 
derive some paths for future research. 
Keywords: political business cycles, politico-economic cycles, electoral cycles, opportunistic 
cycles, conditional political business cycles. 
JEL Classification: B22, D72, D78, E32 
   
1. Introduction2 
 
Forty years ago, William Nordhaus was the first to formalize in an analytical framework the 
idea that the course of macroeconomic variables is influenced by purely political 
considerations (Nordhaus 1975). Until this ground-breaking contribution, in most academic 
works, the government was considered in economic models to be a social planner, 
                                                          
1 Associated member, CES, Université de Paris 1, Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, boulevard de 
l'Hôpital, 75647 Paris cedex 13, France, e-mail: edubois@univ-paris1.fr. I thank William F. Shughart II and the 
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
2 This paper necessitated reading 530 articles or books. The complete list of references is available upon request. 
For convenience, I have disregarded unpublished papers (with a few exceptions) and papers not written in 
English. Despite all our efforts, I was not able to locate approximately 20 published articles or books related to 
the topic. In some contributions, the study of political business cycles is reduced to a simple electoral dummy 
introduced as a control variable among others and sometimes not related to Nordhaus (1975). I have probably 
missed some studies like these. Finally, I note that PBCs, explicitly related or not to Nordhaus (1975), have been 
investigated in somewhat exotic areas (compared to economics): Wasserman (1983) in relation to suicides, 
Nincic (1990) and Gaubatz (1991) in international relations, Shughart and Tollison (1985), Lagona and 
Padovano (2008) and Brechler and Gersl (2014) in legislative activity, Block and Vaaler (2004) in ratings 
published by agencies, Thies and Porche (2007) in agricultural producer protection, Ladewig (2008) in the 
housing market, Horgos and Zimmermann (2010) in the activity of interest groups, Kachelein et al. (2011) in 
electricity supply, and Wehner (2013) in legislative budgetary decisions. Unusual applications in the economic 
area include Paiva (1996) on prices in regulated industries, Castro and Veiga (2004) on the timing of 
stabilization programs, Dreher and Vaubel (2004) on credits from the IMF and IBRD, Ozatay (2007) on public 
sector prices, Faye and Niehaus (2012) on foreign aid, Sukhtankar (2012) on prices paid to farmers for sugar 
cane, Lami, et al. (2014) on household consumption spending, and Klien (2014) on water tariffs. 
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maximizing a social welfare function which coincides with the utility function of the 
representative agent in the economy. This behavior of a “benevolent dictator” in Knut 
Wicksell’s words is inherited from Tinbergen (1952, chapters 1 and 9) and Theil (1958, 
chapter 8). In Nordhaus’s (1975) theory, governments are driven by private interest and care 
only about their reelection prospects. They exploit the short-term Phillips curve and benefit 
from the naïve expectations of voters to attain their goal. As voters are concerned about 
unemployment, the incumbent improves the probability of being reelected by increasing the 
inflation rate so that the unemployment rate decreases just before the election. After the 
election, the government faces a high inflation rate and then implements austerity measures, 
leading to more unemployment. Unemployment and inflation are thus subject to cyclical 
fluctuations linked to the rhythm of elections and these fluctuations are called “political 
business cycles” (PBCs).3 Without going into a detailed presentation of the history of thought, 
it is interesting to see how this article emerged and in particular to examine both the 
forerunners in contributions and the context of the era. 
 The first trace of PBCs can be found in Åkerman (1947), who showed that between 
1830 and 1945 in the United States, short-term economic cycles were linked to the four-year 
presidential election cycle. But his analysis was exclusively empirical and demonstrated no 
precise causal mechanism. Ten years later, Downs (1957a,b), although not explicitly dealing 
with cycles in macroeconomic variables, proposed a hypothesis that would serve as a 
foundation for Nordhaus’s (1975) paper: politicians are driven by private interest. In Anthony 
Downs’s (1957b, p. 28) words: “We assume that they act solely in order to attain the income, 
prestige, and power which come from being in office”. This motivation gives rise to an 
operational objective for politicians: to maximize the number of votes in their favor and win 
the election. However, Downs says nothing about the macroeconomic variables the 
government has to manipulate to reach that goal. He simply states that “by means of 
economic and other actions, [the government] tries to manipulate both present and future 
utility pay-offs to voters in a way that will win their votes” (Downs 1957b, p. 176). According 
to Downs (1957a, p. 137), the government “is an entrepreneur selling policies for votes 
                                                          
3 Although it is the canonical expression, “political business cycles” can lead to possible confusion as it in fact 
refers to a particular type of cycle, namely opportunistic. An opportunistic cycle is the result of political 
manipulations before an election. In contrast, partisan cycles appear as a result of manipulation after the election. 
A generic term to designate both opportunistic and partisan cycles could be “politico-economic cycles” or 
“electoral cycles”. The first author to use the expression political business cycle even if not directly linked to 
elections was Kalecki (1943, p. 330). Michal Kelecki used this expression to qualify the inflation–unemployment 
cycle, which reflects fluctuations in the political power struggle between conflicting social classes. Moreover, he 
was rather silent on the government’s behavior. In his work, the government appears as a passive relay in class 
struggles, favoring the different classes alternately through stop and go policies. 
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instead of products for money”. In this view, there is no room for ideology. Politicians treat 
the possible political choices solely as a means of fulfilling their private objectives, objectives 
that can only be achieved if they are elected: “parties formulate policies in order to win 
elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs 1957b, p. 28). 
Worried only about reelection, they forget the general interest; the benevolent dictator à la 
Wicksell mentioned earlier vanishes. The private interest hypothesis is certainly not new (see 
Smith 1776), but it is the first time that it is applied to politicians.4 
 In their two co-written papers, Bruno Frey and Lawrence Lau take up the Downsian 
hypothesis of self-interest to characterize the government in their model (Frey and Lau 1968; 
Lau and Frey 1971). Popularity is thus considered a form of pressure upon government that 
can lead to electoral defeat if neglected.5 
 In 1971, in a speech at a symposium on the appraisal of the Employment Act of 1946, 
Milton Friedman envisaged the possibility of PBCs under some restrictive assumptions:  
 
…if, in the United States, we had highly precise knowledge of the short-term effects of 
monetary and fiscal policy, and the authorities were not bound by any rigid and well-
enforced rule in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy, then I would predict with 
great confidence a four-year cycle, with unemployment reaching its trough in years 
divisible by four (i.e., presidential election years) and inflation reaching its peak in the 
following year. (Friedman 1972, p. 196) 
  
 Nordhaus’s (1975) paper thus comes after several others. The interesting point here is 
why this particular paper has received so much attention and has occluded most of the 
previous literature. To identify the reasons for this success, one has to go back to the 
beginning of the 1970s when William Nordhaus wrote his paper. 
 In 1972, Nordhaus wrote a first version of his paper and published it in the Cowles 
Foundation Discussion Papers series (Nordhaus 1972). At the Cowles Foundation, he met 
Gerald Kramer and Ray Fair, who had both shown that economic conditions influence 
election results (Kramer 1971; Fair 1975). These works are extremely important because they 
complete those of Downs: as economic outcomes influence the vote, the incumbent who 
                                                          
4 All the same, one notes that the reelection motivation is present, for example, in Tocqueville (1835). 
5 However, in these papers (and in subsequent papers by the same authors and their coauthors), one should note 
that the concept of cycle is missing, the political pressure being permanent and not only during elections. I will 
disregard here the literature concerning this “satisficing” version of the PBC model, but this idea will later be 
taken up and combined in the traditional electoral cycle (see 3.4). 
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wants to be reelected has an incentive to manipulate the economy in order to gain votes. To 
some extent, Nordhaus (1975) therefore echoes the works of Gerald Kramer and Ray Fair. 
 A second reason can be found in the fact that in the 1970s the work of Michal Kalecki 
received new attention and most of his books were then reprinted (see Boddy and Crotty 
1975; Feiwel 1974). Nordhaus (1975) thus emerged in a period when politico-economic 
cycles were fashionable. 
 Third, the popularity gained by Nordhaus (1975) can be explained by the fact that he 
proposed an analytical model that was missing in Åkerman (1947) or Downs (1957a,b) and 
which probably appeared more appealing and trendy than that of Frey and Lau (1968) or Lau 
and Frey (1971), notably because of the use of the Phillips curve. He also provided an 
empirical analysis that only Åkerman (1947) had conducted before him. 
 Fourth, concerning the economic context, William Nordhaus wrote in a period when the 
instability of macroeconomic variables was increasing, notably with regard to the inflation 
rate. These fluctuations, when not expected, are sources of uncertainty that penalize 
investment and undermine growth. Economic scholars were searching for the origins of this 
instability and Nordhaus (1975) provided an answer: the volatility of inflation comes from 
electoral manipulations. 
 Finally, at the beginning of the 1970s, the United States experienced a confidence crisis 
in its elected representatives that reached its climax in August 1974 with President Nixon’s 
resignation after the Watergate scandal. A cynical vision of manipulator politicians was in the 
air and Nordhaus (1975) caught that atmosphere.6 
 Having addressed these considerations of the history of thought, this article aims to 
survey the existing literature on this topic. Of course, many good surveys already exist on 
PBCs.7 The aim here is not only to update these studies, but also to complete them, as many 
aspects developed below are generally not tackled. In section 2, a simplified version of 
Nordhaus’s model, drawn from Artus (1993), is presented with key assumptions and key 
results. As this model, despite its appealing formalization, led to mixed empirical conclusions, 
scholars have put forward several critiques, which have opened up new research fields. These 
main developments are summarized in section 3. Section 4 is devoted to exploration of a 
particular critique addressed to Nordhaus’s model: the fact that the cycle could be conditional, 
                                                          
6 One might note that other articles or books dealing with the idea of PBCs, sometimes written independently of 
Nordhaus (1975), exist: Schumpeter (1939, in particular p. 391), Breton (1974, in particular p. 49), Ben-Porath 
(1975), Lindbeck (1976), Frey and Ramser (1976), Umstead (1977), Wagner (1977) and Lächler (1978). 
7 See de Haan (2013), de Haan and Klomp (2013), Drazen (2000, chapter 7; 2001), Franzese (2000, 2002), 
Franzese and Long-Jusko (2006), Olters (2001) and Shi and Svensson (2003) for the most recent references. 
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especially conditional on the institutional context. Section 5 envisages some promising 
directions for future research. 
 
2. Nordhaus’s (1975) model: a simple presentation of the theory and conclusions of first 
tests 
 
The economy is characterized by an expectation-augmented Phillips curve: 
                                                      )(YY ejjj π−πγ+= , (1) 
where jY  is the output level in period j, Y is the equilibrium output level, jπ  is the inflation 
rate in period j, ejπ  is the expected inflation rate for the period j andγ is a positive constant. 
 The government is penalized by both unemployment and inflation. It maximizes a vote 
function defined as follows: 
                                                     ( ) j2jj mYY~lV π−−−= , (2) 
where Y~ is the target level of output and l and m are parameters measuring discontent with 
unemployment and inflation, respectively. Even if the government does not control it directly, 
the inflation rate is the action variable of the government. The result of the minimization of 
(2) can be interpreted as the inflation rate the government would like see implemented; it is 
the preferred inflation rate of the government. 
 One supposes that there are two periods, noted t and t+1, and that elections take place at 
the end of period t+1. 
 The government minimizes the following intertemporal loss function: 
                                                           1t
t V
1
V
V ++ρ+
= , (3) 
where ρ  is a “forgetting rate” which is supposed to be > 0. This kind of discount rate applied 
to the first period models the fact that individuals have a short memory. At the time of the 
elections, voters have partially forgotten the first period. In combining (1) and (2) and in 
setting α=−YY~ > 0, one obtains: 
                                                 [ ] j2ejjj m)(lV π−π−πγ−α−= . (4) 
And then: 
                           [ ] [ ] 1t2e 1t1tt
2e
tt m)(l
1
m)(l
V +++ π−π−πγ−α−ρ+
π−π−πγ−α−
= . (5) 
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 The key assumption of the model is the characterization of the individuals’ 
expectations. One supposes here that individuals form their expectations in a naïve way:8 
                                                               1j
e
j −π=π . (6) 
In incorporating (6) in (5) and minimizing with respect to tπ and 1+tπ , one obtains the first-
order conditions for the government program: 
                                                        2t1t l2
m
γ
−
γ
α
+π=π +  (7) 
                                                     21tt l2
)2(m
γ
ρ+
−
γ
α
+π=π −  (8) 
 For 22 l2
)2(m
l2
m
γ
ρ+
<
γ
α
<
γ
, one has the classic Nordhaus (1975) result: 
                                                        t1t1tt and π>ππ<π +− . (9) 
A politico-economic cycle occurs. In the period after the elections, the actual inflation rate is 
less than expected. Output declines, which leads to higher unemployment (this will be 
forgotten in the next period). Post-electoral periods are therefore recession periods. In the 
period before the elections, the actual inflation rate is higher than expected. Output increases, 
which leads to lower unemployment. Pre-electoral periods are therefore expansion years. 
Voters are manipulated as they rely on the (low) inflation rate in the previous period to build 
their expectations. 
 The first econometric tests searching for PBCs in inflation and/or unemployment led to 
mixed conclusions. Allen et al. (1986), McGavin (1987), Haynes and Stone (1988, 1989, 
1990), Keil (1988) and Findlay (1990) conclude in favor of Nordhaus’s theory, whereas 
McCallum (1978), Golden and Poterba (1980), Alt and Chrystal (1981), Beck (1982), Alesina 
(1988, 1989) and Davidson et al. (1990) do not. This inconclusive literature has raised some 
questions about Nordhaus’s model, which has been criticized on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. 
 
3. First critiques, new fields 
 
I present here a list of the main critiques9 addressed to Nordhaus’s model and the 
developments that issued from these critiques. 
                                                          
8 Naïve rather than adaptive expectations, as in the Nordhaus model, are used here without loss of generality. 
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3.1. Heterogeneous preferences over inflation and unemployment: partisan cycles 
 
In the Nordhaus model, when inflation increases around the election owing to political 
manipulations, one might think that it does not affect all voters in the same way as it may 
penalize those, for example, who are owners of capital. Nordhaus (1975, p. 173) foresees this 
possibility of a heterogeneous electorate when he states: “It is probably accurate to say that in 
the United States Republicans have consistently been more concerned about inflation and 
Democrats about unemployment”. Kirschen et al. (1964) are the first to classify economic 
policy goals according to the ideology of political parties. They consider, for example, that 
full employment is the first priority of socialist or labor parties, whereas price stability is the 
chief objective of conservative parties. In Frey and Lau (1968), besides the reelection 
constraint, there is an internal pressure on the government, namely ideological satisfaction. 
The government therefore faces a trade-off as both vote maximization and ideological 
satisfaction are entered as arguments in the “felicity function” that the government seeks to 
maximize. This idea of a dual behavior would be taken up by Lau and Frey (1971) and 
empirically tested by several papers at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, 
the more frequently quoted papers being Frey and Schneider (1978a,b). Finally, in 1977, 
Donald Wittman demonstrates analytically that parties with policy preferences as well as 
private interests do not converge (Wittman 1977; completed by Wittman 1983). This goes 
against Downs (1957b), who argues that parties in competition tend to move closer to a 
median platform in order to capture the maximum number of voters. Donald Wittman’s works 
therefore provide a foundation for partisan cycles, developed by Hibbs (1977). According to 
Hibbs’s theory – and unlike Nordhaus (1975) – voters have heterogeneous preferences and 
therefore parties have different ideological goals. The usual way of accounting for these 
differences between parties (and therefore governments) is to consider that they do not have 
the same ideal positions on the short-term Phillips curve. Specifically, conservative 
governments prefer lower inflation and therefore higher unemployment than liberal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
9 For example, the specification of Nordhaus’s (1975) vote function has been criticized (e.g., Frey and Ramser 
1976; Paldam 1981). I do not develop this point here because the debate about vote function was older and the 
critique of Nordhaus (1975) did not give rise to a new strand of literature in this area. However, this issue is 
related to the effectiveness of PBCs. Do the PBCs pay off in terms of votes? Examining the impact of pre-
election budget deficit on reelection probability, Brender and Drazen’s (2008) conclusion is negative. Aidt et al. 
(2011) challenge this view and find that greater expenditures in the election year lead to greater vote differences 
between the incumbent and the main opponent (see also Veiga and Veiga 2007b, in this line). Moreover, some 
refinements of the Nordhaus model are not shown here because they have not yet given rise to further 
developments. 
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governments. The changeover of political power between conservative and liberal 
governments leads to “partisan cycles”.10 Partisan theory would later be developed and tested 
by, among many others, Chappell and Keech (1986), Alesina (1987, 1988, 1989), Alesina and 
Roubini (1992), Alesina et al. (1992, 1993, 1997) and Hibbs (1994). 
 
3.2. Rational expectations: rational political business cycles 
 
In the same year and the same month (April 1975) that William Nordhaus’s article was 
published, an article written by Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace launched what was called 
“the rational expectations revolution” (Sargent and Wallace 1975). Some even spoke about 
“evangelism” (Price 1997, 408). The impact on PBC theory was so important that Alberto 
Alesina (1988, p. 15) would speak about a presumed “devastating effect”. Indeed, if people 
are able perfectly to anticipate government policy, there is no longer a politico-economic 
cycle in the Nordhaus (1975) sense. Minimizing the loss function leads the government to set 
an inflation rate equal to zero for both periods, thus making any expansive policy impossible; 
PBCs disappear.11 
 More than 10 years would pass by before scholars tried to reconcile Nordhaus’s (1975) 
model with rational expectations theory. The two main contributions here are Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990).12 These articles no longer envisage an 
inflation/unemployment trade-off but a state budget problem. Moreover, temporary 
information asymmetry between voters and governments is substituted for the hypothesis of 
non-rational voters. Voters are rational but do not have complete information about the 
government’s competence; they observe it with a delay. Competence is defined as the 
capacity to provide public goods and transfers in an efficient way (i.e., by limiting waste). To 
appear competent, the government pursues an expansive budgetary policy while temporarily 
hiding the harmful consequences from the agents (the increase in the budget deficit). By doing 
                                                          
10 One notes, however, that in partisan theory, the cycle is involuntary: the electoral calendar is a source of 
uncertainty and disrupts the agents who, not knowing which policy will be implemented after the elections, 
anticipate an inflation rate between the parties’ preferred rates. After the elections, expectations necessarily turn 
out to be false, which generates a cycle. 
11 Another way, as chosen by Nordhaus (1989), is to defend adaptive expectations by showing that people do not 
have rational expectations. Early critics of Nordhaus’s view of expectations include, among others, McCallum 
(1978), Keech (1980) and Paldam (1981). In these studies, voters’ sophistication and memory are also debated. 
12 Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) are also often quoted, but if they emphasize the role of information 
asymmetries, they do not deal explicitly with PBCs. Persson and Tabellini (1990) translate Rogoff (1990) into an 
inflation-unemployment setting. 
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so, the government creates the illusion of prosperity until the time when voters realize that 
they will have to “reimburse” by one means or another the deficit thus caused.  
 Generally, following a distinction first introduced by Persson and Tabellini (2000), these 
models are labelled adverse selection models because the government has an informational 
advantage over voters concerning its true competence. Lohmann (1998a) is the first to relax 
this assumption. Both voters and the government have the same information about the 
government’s competence. However, if voters no longer face an adverse selection problem, 
they face a moral hazard problem. The incumbent can indeed modulate his or her level of 
effort and appear better than he or she really is by using policy instruments unobservable to 
the public. 
 In taking advantage of information asymmetry and/or trying to appear as competent as 
possible before the election, politicians behave as in Nordhaus’s model. His conclusions hold 
even when voters are not short-sighted and naïve as long as they are poorly informed about 
the environment, the government’s objectives and/or its ability to manage the economy. 
 
3.3. Instruments versus outcomes 
 
As one has seen above, two key variables in the Nordhaus model are the unemployment and 
inflation rates, outcome variables that are not actually under the direct control of the 
government. This could be one of the reasons why PBCs are not detected in these kinds of 
variables. Tufte (1978) is the first to address the question of the means of action available to 
the government to generate economic expansion before the elections. According to him, “the 
economic policy instruments involved must be easy to start-up quickly and must yield clear 
and immediate economic benefits to a large number of voters” (Tufte 1978, p. 9). An increase 
in real disposable income seems to be a good candidate. Indeed, through taxes and transfers, it 
can quickly be manipulated and with much greater ease and flexibility than unemployment, 
inflation or output growth. If a cycle actually exists, it has to be sought not in the outcomes of 
economic policy, but rather in the instruments of economic policy, which are by definition 
more directly controllable. 
 Empirical tests of the PBC in instruments are much more convincing so that nowadays, 
tests in relation to outcomes are scarce.13 It is impossible to cite all the hundreds of articles 
                                                          
13 One should note, however, that an old and persisting literature exists that highlights the presence of PBCs in 
stock markets. For early references, see Umstead (1977) and Allvine and O'Neill (1980); for more recent 
references, see Sturm (2013) and Kräussl et al. (2014). 
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that seek PBCs in budgetary and monetary variables.14 The most complete studies in terms of 
the sample include Ames (1987), Remmer (1993), Neto and Borsani (2004), and Nieto-Parra 
and Santiso (2012) for Latin America, Block (2002) for Africa, Hallerberg et al. (2002) for 
East Europe, Alesina et al. (1997), Mink and de Haan (2006) and Klomp and de Haan 
(2013a,c) for industrial democracies and Schuknecht (1996, 1999, 2000) for developing 
countries. 
 Of course, the underlying hypothesis is that the government has perfect control over 
policy instruments. This issue will be examined in section 4. 
 
3.4. The political and economic context 
 
Many scholars have emphasized that the context of an election has an influence on the PBC. 
Clearly, if the political and economic conditions are considered good by the agents, success is 
certain for the incumbent government and there is no need to generate a PBC (Dinkel 1981).15 
Two main indicators have been privileged in assessing the electoral context and therefore 
measuring the risk of a government losing the election. 
 The first indicator is the level of popularity. Schultz (1995) was the first to amend the 
traditional PBC dummy variable to take account of the popularity of the government, the 
latter being measured as the differential between the governing party and the main opposition 
party. The test showed that whereas the unconditional electoral dummy and permanent 
popularity lead (in Frey and Schneider’s style) are not significant, the product of both is. This 
conclusion would be confirmed by Carlsen (1997) in relation to re-election probability, Price 
                                                          
14 The legitimacy of tests in terms of instruments rather than outcomes is reinforced by the fact that instruments 
are the action variables in rational PBC models. Besides all of their properties, their use for political purposes is, 
moreover, grounded theoretically. One also notes that budgetary variables are privileged over monetary variables 
because of the conjunction of two elements: 1) for one-country studies, there is a need for a degree of freedom 
which implies resorting to local data; 2) monetary policy is centralized at the national (or supra-national) level 
and is therefore not an instrument available to local governments. 
15 Conversely, when the incumbent expects to lose the election, it may prefer to use the debt strategically instead 
of generating a PBC. In doing so, it can constrain the next government by reducing the latter’s room for 
maneuver. In Borooah and van der Ploeg (1983), the "kamikaze" government, knowing it will lose power, 
pursues a ruinous economic policy, penalizing its successor to the point that the latter will not be reelected, 
which puts the suicidal government back at the helm. While Alesina and Tabellini (1990) predict an increase in 
debt whatever the party, Persson and Svensson (1989) highlight partisan differences according to the preferences 
of each party. The lowest spending party reduces taxes and in doing so, increases debt, thus forcing the next 
party to spend less. However, the highest spending party raises taxes, which creates a surplus and makes the next 
party’s policy easier to implement. This theory was tested with success by Petterson-Lidbom (2001). In Tabellini 
and Alesina (1990), as the preferences of the next majority concerning the composition of expenditures are 
uncertain, the current median voter prefers higher debt to be sure that the next majority will have sufficient scope 
to implement its desired policy. Finally, in Aghion and Bolton (1990), the conservative party accumulates 
deficits when in power and voters reelect it as they deem the opposition (liberal) party unable to fight against 
deficits. 
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(1998) for popularity level, Alt and Rose (2007) for the level of approval, Efthyvoulou (2012) 
in terms of voting intention polls and Klomp and de Haan (2013b) using a measure of popular 
protest.16 
 The second indicator is the level of electoral competitiveness. When an election is not 
competitive, the incumbent has no incentive to generate a PBC. By splitting their sample 
between high competition states and low competition states, Baber and Sen (1986) show that 
the PBC in the situation of debt is stronger in the former. Clingermayer and Wood (1995) 
seem to have been the first to substitute an index of electoral competition for the traditional 
PBC dummy. They conclude that this index has a significant impact on debt before the 
election: debt is higher in states with strong interparty competition in the year preceding an 
election. The presence of such an effect is found in Vergne (2009), Aidt et al. (2011) and 
Benito et al. (2013b), but is rejected by Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2005) and Schneider 
(2010).17 
 The threat of losing an election is only one aspect of the context. Some authors have 
suggested that the identity of the party in power could have an impact on the PBC. Swank and 
Swank (1993) show that in the United States, Republican administrations aim to reduce tax 
rates when elections are approaching, whereas Democratic administrations are more 
concerned with inflation and unemployment. Partisan differences are found in Haynes and 
Stones (1990), Kneebone and McKenzie (2001), Krause (2005), Aidt et al. (2011), Garcia-
Sanchez et al. (2011) and Benito et al. (2013b), but not in Grier (1987) and Haynes and Stone 
(1989). Besides the identity of the party, the distance between parties’ platforms (polarization) 
can also play a role. The larger the distance, the greater the utility loss from losing office and 
the greater the manipulation the incumbent is willing to engage in to be reelected (Alt and 
Lassen 2006; Klomp and de Haan 2013c). Finally, other dimensions of the context include 
                                                          
16 Popularity can be considered a proxy for economic conditions, which can also have a direct impact on PBC. In 
Efthyvoulou (2012), the magnitude of a PBC is weaker when non-economic voting (measured by replies to a 
survey about households’ financial situation) is high. In Hanusch (2012), economic disturbances blur 
competence signals, which dampen PBCs. In Canes-Wrone and Park (2012), the traditional PBC is invisible 
because it is cancelled by another cycle in private investment which drops before the election owing to electoral 
uncertainty. In Alpanda and Honig (2010), the government is constrained in generating a PBC by its borrowing 
capacity. Finally, endowment in natural resources can play a role (Vergne 2009). 
17 This can be related to the growing literature on leviathan behavior (Brennan and Buchanan 1980), in which 
politicians are viewed as power-maximizing agents whose only purpose is to maximize the size of the public 
sector. In this literature, the electoral constraint modelled by the margin (the difference in vote shares or the 
distance from a 50% vote share) affects budget outcomes. Ultimately, the empirical test looks very much like a 
classic PBC test in which the margin is substituted for the traditional electoral dummy. However, the 
interpretation is different. In the leviathan model, the margin is expected to be related positively to expenditure 
and taxes. The larger the margin, the greater the government’s capacity to increase expenditures and taxes 
(Dubois et al. 2007; Solé-Ollé 2003, 2006). In the PBC model, the larger the margin, the lower the incentive to 
intervene to secure reelection and the lower the expenditures and the higher the tax. 
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political alignment or affiliation (i.e., when local and national executives belong to the same 
party) as shown in Lema and Streb (2013) and Rumi (2014), the strength of political parties 
(Shelton 2014) and the strength of the incumbent government, a divided or fragmented 
government being less able to generate a PBC because of coordination costs (Alt and Rose 
2007; Rose 2008; Klomp and de Haan 2013c; but see Geys 2007, for a challenging view). 
 
4. Taking into account the institutional context: conditional political business cycles 
 
I focus here on three features of the institutional context: the electoral calendar, the 
governance system, regime and rule, and the constraints on economic policy.18 
 
4.1. The electoral calendar: length of terms and endogenous elections 
 
In Nordhaus’s (1975) model, the institutional context appears as a watermark throughout the 
lengths of office terms. For Nordhaus (1975), reducing the length of terms or the number of 
terms imposes a time constraint on the government, which is no longer able to generate a 
cycle (see, in a similar vein, Besley and Case 1995; Streb 1999; Grier and Grier 2000; 
Bordignon et al. 2003; Rose 2006, 2008; Alt and Rose 2007; Klein 2010; Aidt et al. 2011; 
Benito et al. 2013b; Sjahrir et al. 2013; Klein and Sakurai 2015).19 For Amacher and Boyes 
(1978), reducing the frequency of elections reduces their cost. At the extreme, an infinite 
length of the electoral cycle could enable such a result (MacRae 1977). Lindbeck (1976) 
suggests choosing the date of elections randomly. In both cases, if the date of the next election 
is not known, the government cannot anticipate when it has to generate the cycle. However, 
these options are not compatible with a democratic system. On the optimal length of the 
electoral term, see also Chappell and Peel (1979), Ginsburgh and Michel (1983), Keech and 
Simon (1983), Baleiras and Santos (2000) and Ferris and Voia (2009). 
                                                          
18 Several other institutional variables that may exert an impact on the magnitude of PBCs have been studied: the 
quality of institutions by Shi and Svensson (2006), government transparency by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 
(2004), corruption by Shi and Svensson (2006), globalization by Efthyvoulou (2011), social capital measured by 
the level of generalized trust by Kouvavas (2013), direct versus indirect elections by Sjahrir et al. (2013) and the 
degree of decentralization (Vergne 2009; Shelton 2014). Among these miscellaneous issues, the special role of 
the media emerges. As one has seen, information is crucial in the formation of PBCs as informational 
asymmetries could be at their heart. The better informed the voters, the better their evaluation of government 
competence, which diminishes the incentives for the government to generate a PBC. Shi and Svensson (2006), 
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Alt and Rose (2007), Vergne (2009) and Shelton (2014) have found that 
voters’ access to media or media freedom does indeed have an impact on the magnitude of a PBC. 
19 Some of these studies do not deal explicitly with term limits but investigate an issue that is quite close, i.e., 
what happens to the PBC when the incumbent is seeking reelection (on the understanding that it is allowed to do 
so). 
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 Besides the considerations linked to term length, one of the hypotheses of the Nordhaus 
(1975) model is the exogeneity of the electoral calendar. Elections are held on dates set by 
law, known to everyone. Frey and Schneider (1978b) and Lächler (1982) were among the first 
to remark that this hypothesis is not valid for all countries, as in Japan and the United 
Kingdom, for example, elections are organized by the government on the date desired (as long 
as it falls before the constitutional or statutory “sell by” date, e.g., six years in the UK). 
Elections are thus labelled “endogenous”. This institutional feature has an important 
implication for Nordhaus’s (1975) theory: rather than generate an economic cycle at the 
moment of the elections, the government will call elections in an expansionary economic 
period to ensure its reelection. As Inoguchi (1979) puts it, they “surf” on the economic cycle. 
It is no longer the economic cycle that follows the political cycle but the reverse. This can be 
viewed as a means of reducing distortions as the government no longer has to manipulate the 
business cycle but only to choose the election date with care (Terrones 1989). Nothing is 
changed in empirical terms as an election should be observed during an economic expansion, 
whereas in the exogenous version, an economic expansion should be observed in the run-up to 
an election. Finally, one can imagine a combination of both in which the government 
generates an economic expansion and then chooses the election date in consequence. 
 Following Inoguchi (1979), numerous empirical studies have been undertaken in which 
the occurrence of elections is explained by, among other determinants, the economic 
conditions: Ito and Park (1988), Ito (1990, 1991), Kohno and Nishizawa (1990), Cargill and 
Hutchison (1991), Suzuki (1994) and Heckelman and Berument (1998) for Japan, Annett 
(1993) for Ireland, Chowdhury (1993) and Khemani (2004) for India, Balke (1990), 
Heckelman and Berument (1998) and Smith (2003, 2004) for the United Kingdom, Reid 
(1998), Dickson et al. (2013) and Voia and Ferris (2013) for Canada and Telatar (2003) and 
Karakas (2014) for Turkey.20 In their panel study, Shi and Svensson (2006) reject a direct 
effect of the timing of the election date on the magnitude of the PBC observed for the surplus. 
References that distinguish between pre-determined elections and endogenous elections in the 
detection of PBCs include Brender and Drazen (2005), Vergne (2009), Katsimi and 
Sarantides (2012) and Ehrhart (2013). 
 Finally, it has been shown that a political business cycle in a particular country could 
generate cross-country spillovers (Tufte 1978; Thompson and Zuk 1983; Ito 1991; Dobson 
                                                          
20 See also the panel data studies of Alesina et al. (1997) and Palmer and Whitten (2000). It should be noted that 
besides these empirical studies, analytical models of the choice of election date have been proposed (see, among 
others, Smith 1996; Kayser 2005). 
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and Dufrene 1993; Foerster 1994; Foerster and Schmitz 1997; Katada and McKeown 1998; 
Sapir and Sekkat 1999, 2002; Nippani and Arize 2005). To eliminate such imported cycles, 
some scholars wonder about the opportunity to synchronize electoral calendars and to set a 
uniform election date for all countries belonging to the same geographic area (Sapir and 
Sekkat 1999; Breuss 2008). 
 
4.2. System, regime and rule 
 
Regarding the system, the impact of two dimensions on PBC has been studied: an 
authoritarian versus democratic system and new versus old democracy. In a quite intuitive 
way, in a country where the incumbent is the sole candidate, the probability of losing power is 
nil and there is therefore no incentive to generate a PBC. Block et al. (2003) find support for 
this hypothesis. Nevertheless, it has been shown that PBCs occur even in non-democratic 
systems: in Egypt (Blaydes 2011), in Mexico (Gonzalez 2002), in China (Guo 2009), in 
Malaysia (Pepinsky 2007) and in the Republic of Korea (Soh 1988). The idea is that even in 
authoritarian systems, political leaders have to be sufficiently popular to avoid contestation 
and removal. 
 Block et al. (2003) hypothesize that initial or founding multiparty elections would 
present both the greatest incentives for and the fewest constraints on electoral economic 
manipulation. On the one hand, through the entry of challengers, an election introduces 
uncertainty for the authoritarian incumbent, who is therefore more likely to generate a PBC. 
On the other hand, in founding elections, there is little chance of a free press or other 
institutional constraints. In a similar vein, according to Brender and Drazen (2005), PBCs are 
more pronounced in new democracies because of lack of experience with electoral politics, 
lack of information available to voters, or both. This hypothesis is confirmed by Brender and 
Drazen (2007) and Klomp and de Haan (2013b,c) but rejected by Hagen (2007) and Barberia 
and Avelino (2011). Other articles on this topic include Veiga and Pinho (2007), Efthyvoulou 
(2012) and Shelton (2014). Although the debate has focused on old versus new democracy 
issues in recent years, some studies show that democracy reduces PBCs, mostly because it is a 
proxy for other factors that may mitigate PBCs, such as governmental transparency or the 
media (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004). 
 Persson and Tabellini (2003) were the first to study the impact of the political regime 
(parliamentary versus presidential) and electoral rule (proportional versus majority) on PBCs 
(see also Chang 2008; Efthyvoulou 2012; Klomp and de Haan 2013c; Shelton 2014). They 
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expect different patterns in PBCs because, according to them, majoritarian elections are 
associated with stronger individual accountability than proportional elections, in which 
politicians are more accountable collectively. Moreover, proportional electoral rules give 
politicians stronger incentives to seek support by endorsing broad policy programs, such as 
welfare state spending, whereas majoritarian electoral rules instead induce them to target 
spending to smaller geographic groups (marginal districts with more swing voters). As 
individual political accountability supplies greater incentives to manipulate than collective 
accountability, stronger electoral cycles are expected under presidential regimes as decisions 
are concentrated in the hands of a few decision makers. Linked to the voting rule, Aidt and 
Mooney (2014) use the natural experiment of a change in suffrage (taxpayer suffrage versus 
universal suffrage) to study how it affects the PBC. If the PBC is present under both rules, all 
fiscal variables are not affected in the same way. They observe a reduction in tax under 
taxpayer suffrage (as the right to vote is linked to the obligation to pay local taxes) and an 
increase in capital spending under universal suffrage (as all adult residents can vote, which 
creates a larger demand for public goods). 
 
4.3. Constraints on economic policy 
 
In Nordhaus’s (1975) model, the action variable of the government is the inflation rate. If one 
adopts a monetarist view of inflation, separating the monetary authority from the political 
power (for example, through an independent central bank21) should be a means of eliminating 
PBCs.22 Most of the empirical literature draws this conclusion (Clark and Reichert 1998; 
Hadri et al. 1998; Gärtner 1999; Clark and Hallerberg 2000; Leertouwer and Maier 2001; 
Hallerberg et al. 2002; Hiroi 2009; Alpanda and Honig 2009, 2010). 
 However, some case studies cast doubt on this general conclusion as in countries such as 
Germany or the United States, PBCs seem to survive even when the monetary policy is 
                                                          
21 In fact, through all of the settings that reduce inflationary bias: implementation of a rule (Barro and Gordon 
1983), contract between the government and the central bank (Walsh 1995; see al-Nowaihi and Levine 1998, for 
the impact of such a contract on PBCs) or the appointment of a conservative central banker (Rogoff 1985). 
22 One might ask why the government could choose to give up the monetary instrument which could be so 
important in generating PBCs and therefore helpful in reelection. First, monetary policy would be less useful 
because it is less adapted to targeted interventions toward groups of voters. Fiscal instruments are more easily 
manipulated and have more immediate and clear impacts. Political gains from inflation are relatively blurred. 
Second, the adoption of an independent central bank could be a sign of good will towards the financial market to 
obtain more credibility and a better reputation. Credibility and reputation are crucial to obtain the confidence of 
the financial market and this confidence should help finance the public debt, which is also a tool for generating 
PBCs. Third, adopting an independent central bank could reduce volatility; volatility generates uncertainty and 
penalizes investment and therefore economic growth, which is the key indicator in the voters’ eyes. 
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conducted by an “independent” central bank. Numerous studies have shown the presence of 
monetary PBCs in the United States (Grier 1987, 1989; Williams 1990; Carlsen 1997; 
Abrams and Iossifov 2006) and in Germany (Johnson and Siklos 1994; Vaubel 1997; 
Lohmann 1998b). How can the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bundesbank, reputed to be the 
two most independent central banks in the world generate a PBC? An answer lies in the 
distinction between “de jure” or “legal” independence, i.e., that warranted by the central bank 
status, and “de facto” or “actual” independence, i.e., that which can be derived from 
observation of the central bank behavior (see, in particular Cukierman 1992, on this 
distinction). The difference observed between these two types of independence could be the 
result of pressures directly exerted by the government (Abrams 2006; Abrams and Butkiewicz 
2012), or indirectly through interventions in the media presenting the government’s side 
(Havrilesky 1988; Froyen et al. 1997; Maier et al. 2002). Government can also control the 
independent central bank through appointments to the board: see Havrilesky and Schweitzer 
(1990), Gildea (1990) and Havrilesky and Gildea (1992) for the United States, and Sieg 
(1997) and Lohmann (1998b) for Germany. Other scholars argue that PBCs detected in 
monetary instruments are the results of PBCs in fiscal instruments accommodated by the 
monetary authority (Laney and Willett 1983; Allen 1986; Beck 1987; Allen and McCrickard 
1991). 
 Besides an independent central bank, other monetary institutions may have an impact on 
the magnitude of the PBC. Among these, the foreign exchange regime is one the most studied 
(Clark and Reichert 1998; Schuknecht 1999; Clark and Hallerberg 2000; Leertouwer and 
Maier 2001; Hallerberg et al. 2002; Hiroi 2009; Alpanda and Honig 2010; Shelton 2014). The 
argument is that a fixed exchange rate regime limits the autonomy of domestic monetary 
policy and therefore prevents monetary manipulations for electoral purposes. Indeed, in a 
fixed exchange rate regime, attention is focused on maintaining exchange rates, which may 
imply the use of monetary tools in a way that the government considers undesirable for is 
reelection prospects (e.g., monetary contraction, upward adjustment of interest rates). A 
complementary implication is that in this case, government focuses on fiscal policy, so that a 
PBC in fiscal policy is more likely to happen in a fixed exchange rate regime. 
 Up to now, I have considered constraints on monetary instruments. Clearly, several 
constraints also limit the use of fiscal instruments. Various fiscal rules can reduce PBCs: 
balanced budget requirements or budget targets (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1998; Clark and 
Hallerberg 2000; Rose 2006; Alt and Rose 2007; Donahue and Warin 2007; Schneider 2010; 
Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2011; Benito et al. 2013a; Klomp and de Haan 2013c), delegation to a 
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strong finance minister (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1998; Clark and Hallerberg 2000), checks 
and balances23 (Chang 2008; Streb et al. 2009, 2012, 2013; Ho and Huang 2013; Shelton 
2014) and transparency24 (Alt and Lassen 2006; Alt and Rose 2007; Vicente et al. 2013; 
Shelton 2014). 
 Because of all of these constraints, it is increasingly difficult for governments to pursue 
all-around and indiscriminate fiscal policies for electoral purposes. A solution is to play with 
the distribution rather than with the amount of spending. This need is reinforced by the fact 
that targeted spending also yields more visible results. Numerous studies have tried to detect a 
PBC in targeted spending.25 The specific components most studied are public employment 
(Spafford 1981; Levitt 1997; Katsimi 1998; Ames et al. 2005; Coelho et al. 2006; Gamez and 
Ibarra-Yunez 2007; Remmer 2007), public wages (Borjas 1984; Klein 2004; Gamez and 
Ibarra-Yunez 2007), defense (Nincic and Cusack 1979; Cusack and Ward 1981; Griffin et al. 
1982a,b; Mintz and Hicks 1984; Zuk and Woodburry 1986; Kamlet and Mowery 1987; Mintz 
and Ward 1987; Mintz 1988; Su et al. 1993), culture (Getzner 2002; 2004; Noonan 2007; 
Nogare and Galizzi 2011; Benito et al. 2013b) and infrastructure (Blais and Nadeau 1992; 
Chaudhuri and Dasgupta 2005; Goeminne and Smolders 2014). More global studies 
investigate PBCs in several spending components to discriminate those privileged by the 
incumbent: for example, van Dalen and Swank (1996), Kneebone and McKenzie (2001), Galli 
and Rossi (2002), Serritzlew (2005), Veiga and Veiga (2007a,b), Vergne (2009), Drazen and 
Eslava (2010), Katsimi and Sarantides (2012), Enkelmann and Leibrecht (2013), Brender and 
Drazen (2013). Most of these studies conclude in favor of PBCs in most visible components. 
However, one has to be cautious about what “visible” means here. For example, even if both 
imply an increase in education spending, building a school is visible whereas raising teachers’ 
wages is not (except to teachers). There could be also a problem of accountability depending 
on which elections and which aspects of spending are considered. For example, building a 
hospital may not favor the reelection of a local incumbent because voters hold the national 
government responsible for such spending. 
 
5. Paths for future research 
                                                          
23 Usually measured by an index of the political constraints facing the executive when implementing policy. 
24 Usually measured by an index coding several aspects of the budget process (e.g., budget cycle frequency, the 
existence of multi-year expenditure forecasts, the requirement of published performance measures). In a 
somewhat related approach, Mourao (2008) shows that fiscal illusion, in hiding the real fiscal situation, 
aggravates the PBC. Finally, financial transparency should not be mistaken for transparency understood as the 
absence of corruption, which can also influence the PBC (Shi and Svensson 2006, Klomp and de Haan 2013c). 
25 Similarly, some scholars have studied PBCs in targeted taxes (e.g., Karran 1985; Ashworth and Heyndels 
2002; Chaudhuri and Dasgupta 2005; Ehrhart 2013). 
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Can one derive some promising directions for future research on PBCs? Looking at past 
surveys, this exercise, even if traditional, appears to be quite perilous. Indeed, with the notable 
exception of Chortareas (1999), no scholar has been an accurate visionary in this respect. In 
his conclusion, Chortareas (1999, p.137) states “The institutional structure within which the 
PBC is typically studied is assumed given. Institutions change and how this change affects the 
PBC is not usually discussed. Such analysis may provide valuable insights”. Launching 
ourselves into the breach, I propose a research agenda for the next two decades. However, to 
be prudent, I limit myself to proposing a collection of slight improvements. First, although 
some (national) studies already exist (Lema and Streb 2013; Rumi 2014), more attention 
could be paid to partisan vertical affinities. Indeed, one might think that PBCs at the local 
level would be reinforced if the local government shared the same political options as the 
national government. Second, it could be interesting to examine if PBCs are stronger in the 
case of simultaneous elections (see Veiga and Veiga 2007a, for a first attempt in Portugal). It 
would be logical as the stakes are more important. The US case, with presidential and 
congressional elections held in the same year (compared to midterm elections), or the French 
case, with presidential and legislative elections held in the same year since 2002 (compared to 
past elections), could be good fields of investigation. Third, even after four decades, one still 
knows very little about the duration of electoral effects. How long does the influence of 
political manipulation last? One quarter? One year? There is essentially no answer to this 
question. There is also no reason to think that this duration is fixed and cannot change from 
one country to another, or within the same country from one election to another, and/or from 
one instrument to another. Scholars who believe in PBCs tend to “force” the tests and select 
the duration for which the electoral dummy is (the most) significant. For transparency 
purposes, I militate in favor of generalizing practice, possibly through a table in an annex, to 
show the significance of the electoral variable for different durations. Fourth, the personal 
characteristics of candidates can alter the shape of the PBC. The first insights are given by 
Brollo and Troiano (2013) and Alesina et al. (2015). Brollo and Troiano (2013) find that, 
when elections are approaching, even if there is no gender difference in transfers and health 
care services, male mayors hire relatively more temporary public employees than female 
mayors. Alesina et al. (2015) show that younger politicians are more likely to increase 
expenditures in pre-election years. We can note that these personal characteristics may also 
have an indirect impact on PBCs by influencing the probability of reelection and therefore the 
incentives to generate PBCs. Fifth, although most key economic variables have been studied, 
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one might note that no PBC has been sought in relation to income or wealth inequality. If one 
disregards the fact that it is an outcome, this variable is interesting for at least two reasons. 
First, there is no consensus as to whether inequalities are good for the economy. Second, in 
some countries (e.g., France), inequalities are a strong political marker, which leads us to 
think that different parties will not generate PBCs with the same pattern. Sixth and finally, 
changes in the definition of the population of registered voters could influence the PBCs. For 
example, switching from a system of suffrage based on a tax threshold to universal suffrage 
(as in Aidt and Mooney 2014), allowing women to vote, or lowering the voting age, are 
natural experiments through which modifications in the PBC could be studied. Indeed, one 
might consider that these changes could modify the structure of spending by shifting the 
target according to the new voters’ characteristics. 
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